INTRODUCTION
As It aly celebrat es 150 years of life as a unified St at e, it remains a divided count ry. Not wit hst anding decades of explicit regional policies and t he const it ut ional commit ment t hat all It alian cit izens have equal right s, access t o essent ial services and minimum living st andards irrespect ive of where t hey live, not j ust t he Nort h-Sout h divide remains sizeable but it s overcome may be challenged even furt her by recent polit ical, inst it ut ional and economic development s.
Much of t he int ervent ion t o redress t he Nort h-Sout h divide aft er t he Second
World War t ook t he form of large public invest ment programmes and subsidies t o firms, under t he so called " Special Int ervent ion" for t he Mezzogiorno. Successful during t he first 15 years in det ermining high growt h rat es and a reduct ion of t he per capit a income gap bet ween Mezzogiorno and Cent re-Nort h (Barca 2001 ), on t he whole it failed t o " develop an aut onomous and compet it ive indust rial base" in t his area (Sykes 1998) . As a result , t he Special Int ervent ion was abolished in t he early 1990s and replaced, aft er a brief period of st alemat e, wit h a ' new regional policy' , t he nuova programmazione. This ent ailed a shift t owards an endogenous development paradigm, charact erised by t he emphasis on t he exploit at ion of underut ilised pot ent ials and local act or mobilisat ion, programme-based st rat egies, and implement at ion t hrough t he ordinary administ rat ion of t he St at e, at bot h nat ional and regional levels.
The present cont ribut ion focuses on t his last phase of It alian regional development policy, wit h a part icular emphasis on development s occurred during t he past t here years. A number of reasons led t o frame t he paper in t his way: first , whilst t here is copious evidence on t he successes and failures of bot h t he Special Int ervent ion and t he nuova programmazione (as implement ed during t he 2000-06 programming period), t he most recent development s in It alian regional policy have not yet been examined. Second, for t he first t ime since t he end of t he Special Int ervent ion, from t he beginning of t he 2007-13 programming period It alian regional policy for t he Mezzogiorno does not coincide wit h cohesion policy. This lack of coincidence provides t he room for a t est on t he sust ainabilit y of t he domest ic side of t he policy, which is not subj ect t o t he same ' ext ernal' (European) const raint s t hat apply t o it s cofunded count erpart . Last ly, t he period from 2007 t o dat e has represent ed a phase of subst ant ial impasse in t he implement at ion of t he policy: t he domest ic side st alled, whilst t he EU-confinanced side met considerable delays, wit h spend below t he average levels of 2000-06: t he causes of t his poor financial performance are yet t o be fully ascert ained. This paper will show t hat a primary fact or in det ermining t he nuova programmazione' s disappoint ing performance has been t he lack of polit ical commit ment , which has culminat ed in t he subst ant ial depart ure from t his policy approach. It will also demonst rat e t hat beyond t he polit ical rhet oric on t he import ance of t he Mezzogiorno, in realit y t he goal of t he development and cat ching up of t his area is not a primary concern of t he current Government ' s agenda.
THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE TODAY -SOME DATA
The Nort h-Sout h economic and social divide in It aly is a long-st anding quest ion t hat has accompanied t he life of t he It alian St at e since it s birt h as a put at ive unit ary count ry in 1861. The first policy act ion t o address t he socio-economic backwardness of t his part of Count ry dat es back t o t he Giolit t i age, when t he first special laws t o t his purpose were approved. 1 Since t hen, t he need for a policy response t o t he ' Mezzogiorno quest ion' -la quest ione meridionale -has been a const ant feat ure in t he It alian polit ical debat es, albeit wit h policy responses t hat have changed markedly, bot h in t erms of rat ionale and int ensit y, over t ime.
Yet , abundant evidence -from t he st at ist ics of t he nat ional st at ist ics inst it ut e (ISTAT) t o t he st udies by SVIMEZ, t he Bank of It aly 2 and t he Depart ment for Development and
Economic Cohesion, t o t he research of independent regional economist s and economic geographers 3 -shows t hat t his dualit y remains st ill t oday a fundament al aspect of t he count ry' s polit ical and social landscape. Indeed, over t he past decade, it has even worsened.
As a way of background for t he analysis t hat will follow, let us consider t he sit uat ion t oday: despit e a slight convergence t rend during t he 2002-08 period (largely caused by t he different demographic dynamics in t he t wo part s of t he count ry, not ably, Sout h-t o-Nort h migrat ion and t he higher number of foreign immigrant s in t he Nort h), GDP per capit a in t he
Mezzogiorno cont inues t o be consist ent ly lower t han t he nat ional and EU averages (Minist ero dello Sviluppo Economico 2009) . In 2010, t he Cent re-Nort h had a GDP per head of €29,869 (c. US$ 42,640), against a mere €17,466 of t he Sout h (c. US$ 24,934) and a nat ional average of €25,583 (c. US$ 36,522) (SVIMEZ 2011). In 2009, none of t he eight Mezzogiorno regions had a level of GDP in line wit h t he nat ional average, against all but one Cent reNort h regions (Umbria) (Bianchi et al 2011) . Economic analyses concur t hat a real and sust ained GDP convergence process occurred only unt il t he mid 1970s (Franco 2010; Iona et al 2010) .
1 Those passed for region Basilicat a in 1904, following a visit of Minist er Zanardelli t o t he region in 1902, t hat for t he indust rialisat ion of Naples, also of 1904, and t hose for Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia, which were passed in t he years 1906-07 (Carabba, p. 9) . 2 As t hose present ed in t he volumes edit ed by Cannari (2009) and Cannari and Franco (2010) . 3 E.g. more recent ly, Viest i 2009.
Employment and unemployment dynamics also show t he significance of t he regional problem. The employment rat e of working-age populat ion different ial bet ween t he t wo part s of t he Count ry was in 2010 of 20 percent age point s (64% in t he Cent re-Nort h versus 43.9% in t he Sout h) whilst in t he same year in Sout hern regions less t han half of t he act ive working age populat ion was in employment (wit h part icularly low peaks in Campania, where t he employment rat e was under 40%) (SVIMEZ 2011, p. 15 ). What ' s more, t he employment rat e of young people (14-34) was of only 31.7% in t he Mezzogiorno, against a rat e of 56.5% in t he rest of t he count ry. In similar vein, unemployment levels in t he Sout h are considerably higher t han in t he remainder of t he count ry. According t o t he most recent SVIMEZ calculat ions, t he average unemployment rat e in t he Mezzogiorno in 2010 was 13.4%, 7 point s higher t han in t he Cent re-Nort h, but wit h t he aggravat ing circumst ance t hat " whilst in t he Cent re-Nort h t he loss of j obs t ends t o t ransform it self almost ent irely in t he search for new j obs. In t he Mezzogiorno, on t he cont rary, t his t ransforms it self only in a minimal part in explicit research of a new occupat ion, cont ribut ing [inst ead] t o feed t he area of inact ivit y and t he irregular employment " (SVIMEZ 2011, p. 15) . SVIMEZ has est imat ed t hat if one included also t he workers in receipt of unemployment benefit 4 in t he unemployed st at ist ics and t hose who are not in employment but also not act ively seeking a new j ob, t he act ual figure of unemployment in t he Mezzogiorno during 2010 would rise t o j ust over 25%, against a figure of around 10% in t he Cent re-Nort h (' correct ed' unemployment rat e) (SVIMEZ 2001, p. 16 ), a figure which is similar t o t hat report ed by CNEL in it s lat est annual report on t he labour market (24.5%, CNEL 2010a).
More t han t wo t hirds of cit izens below t he povert y t hreshold (relat ive povert y indicat or) live in t he Mezzogiorno (Franco 2010) , where also more generally, privat e household consumpt ion st at it st ics show t hat families, not least as a result of t he recent recession, find it harder t o make ends meet (as shown by a cont ract ion in t he expendit ure for primary goods, compared t o a st able sit uat ion in t he remainder of t he count ry) (SVIMEZ 2011).
The recent economic crisis has also shown t hat t he economic st ruct ure of t he Mezzogiorno is st ruct urally weaker and more vulnerable t han in t he remainder of t he Count ry. It aly on t he whole has been badly hit by t he recession, wit h a fall of 5 percent in real GDP (Padovani 2011, p. 12) .
Nonet heless, t he above pict ure should be read in conj unct ion wit h t he fact t hat during t he past t en years t he ent ire count ry, not j ust t he Mezzogiorno, has st alled, as demonst rat ed by t he fall of per head GDP relat ive t o t he EU27 average of 15 point s bet ween 2000 and 2009 (Dipart iment o per lo Sviluppo e la Coesione Economica 2010, p. 7). This fact has led t o a new vision of t he regional problem according t o which t he underdevelopment of t he Sout h cannot be conceived solely in t erms of t he t radit ional gap of per capit a GDP and employment / unemployment rat es, rat her as pert aining t o t he persist ence of " socially unsust ainable gaps, in t erms of qualit y of services essent ial t o t he life of cit izens, unmot ivat ed for a nat ional st at e" (Barca 2010, p. 175) and cont rary t o t he It alian Const it ut ion, according t o which all cit izens, irrespect ively of where t hey live, are ent it led t o a level of essent ial services guarant eed across t he nat ional t errit ory (art . 117). This gap concerns t he availabilit y of basic essent ial services -such as nurseries, schools, adequat e healt hcare and physical infrast ruct ure, e.g. in t he fields of t ransport , wast e and wat erwhich remain in t he Sout hern regions below t he nat ional average. It is on t hese areas t hat current regional policy is placing part icular emphasis.
What ever measurement of t he Nort h-Sout h divide is used, t he key issue is t hat it is st ill subst ant ial, and a fundament al quest ion is why it is st ill so marked aft er decades of regional policy int ervent ion. This quest ion acquires part icular relevance if one compares t he Mezzogiorno t o t he way east Germany has caught up wit h t he west of t he count ry wit h regard t o t he availabilit y of high qualit y infrast ruct ures and human capit al (Cannari and Franco 2009 ); t he improvement s in sout hern Spain in t he provision of essent ial public services (now at levels equivalent t o t he rest of t he Count ry) (Barca 2010) ; and t he economic growt h and cat ching-up realised by t he lagging regions in East ern Europe (Cannari et al 2010a) .
The present paper at t empt s t o answer t his quest ion focusing part icularly on t he last t en t o fift een years of regional policy int ervent ion, t he period t hat has marked t he rise first and t hen t he fall of t he so called " nuova programmazione" (new programming).
THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLICY RESPONSE -FROM THE

NUOVA PROGRAMMAZIONE TO THE PIANO SUD
As in ot her European count ries, regional policy in It aly became a fundament al part of economic policy aft er t he second world war, " when it found resonance in wider discourses int ernat ionally of what has subsequent ly been called nat ional spat ial Keynesianism" (González 2011, p. 65; see also Lepore 2001 , Maes 2008 , Saraceno 1983 . At t his t ime t he " Special Int ervent ion" for t he Mezzogiorno was inaugurat ed, wit h t he est ablishment of a special fund (Law 646/ 1950) , ent rust ed t o a special agency (Gualini 2004, p. 82) 6 . The special int ervent ion would be abolished in 1992, amidst crit icism of lack of effect iveness, account abilit y and, in lat er years, allegat ions of client elism in t he handling of subsidies and dominance of polit ical and part y int erest over economic efficiency as t he guiding principle for localising invest ment s (Ruffolo 2011; Gualini 2004; Barca 2001; Trigilia 1992; Sykes 1998) . It would be replaced wit h an ' Ordinary Int ervent ion' -i.e. a policy delivered t hrough t he ordinary public administ rat ion -for ' depressed' areas t hroughout t he count ry. This shift would soon be followed by a new approach t o regional development , which has become known as t he nuova programmazione (new programming). The nuova programmazione was in many ways ant it het ic t o t he Special Int ervent ion, not j ust wit h regard t o t he administ rat ion of policy, but also in it s st rat egic rat ionale, based on t he concept of endogenous development , t o be achieved t hrough t he mobilisat ion of local act ors, rat her t han t op-down planning. It essent ially reversed t he perspect ive of t he Special Int ervent ion: whereas t he Special Int ervent ion t arget ed indust rial development , assuming t hat t his would bring social, civil and inst it ut ional development , t he nuova programmazione focuses on t he const ruct ion of social capit al, believing t hat t his would lead, in t he longer run, t o a virt uous growt h (Cannari et al 2010b, quot ed in Servidio and Prezioso 2011) .
Launched in 1998 wit h t he st rong endorsement of t he t hen Treasury Minist er Carlo Azeglio Ciampi in a document called " One hundred ideas for development " (Minist ero del Tesoro, Bilancio e Programmazione Economica 1998), t he nuova prorgammazione t allied wit h a wider decent ralisat ion reform process promot ed at t he same t ime by t he It alian Government (t he so-called Bassanini legislat ion) and resonat ed well wit h t he emerging new paradigm for regional development which was being promot ed by t he OECD and t he European Commission based on a shift from a compensat ion t o endogenous development and focused on regional compet it iveness, t o be achieved t hrough t he full exploit at ion of underut ilised local asset s and resources (OECD 2003; Bacht ler 2001; Bacht ler and Raines, 2002) , what would lat er become known as a ' place-based' approach ). Operat ionally, t he new policy in It aly was delivered mainly t hrough t he 2000-06 generat ion of cohesion policy programmes (under which It alian regional policy overall ended up being subsumed). For t he Sout h of It aly, t his consist ed of a supra-regional Communit y Support Framework implement ed by 14 Operat ional Programmes: 7 regional programmes (t o which were assigned circa 70% of t he resources) and 7 nat ional ones (for areas where nat ional direct ion or coordinat ion was deemed necessary or involving int ervent ions of supra-regional scale).
In t his same period, an import ant development t ook place also wit h regard t o t he domest ic side of regional policy: in 2003 the Fund for Underut ilised Areas was creat ed, t o bring t he different st rands of domest ic regional policy t hat exist ed under various budget lines int o a single framework, t hereby improving clarit y, t ransparency and longer-t erm predict abilit y. It was a first st ep t owards t he int egrat ion of t he t wo st reams of funding for regional development -European and domest ic -int o a single framework, as ant icipat ed in t he document " 100 ideas" , and t hat would be int roduced, only in principle as will be seen, in t he new regional development st rat egy for t he period 2007-13, t he so-called Nat ional St rat egic Framework.
The 2000-06 programming experience concluded wit h mixed and on t he whole disappoint ing result s, wit h achievement s below t he t arget s est ablished at t he out set (Barca 2006 ). This generat ed t he much welcomed emergence of a debat e on t he successes and failures of regional policy in t his period, for inst ance: t he copious analyt ical and reconnaissance work undert aken by SVIMEZ, including a number of recent init iat ives organised t o mark t he 150 years from unificat ion; a research programme by t he Bank of It aly (which culminat ed in t wo seminars held in 2009); a parliament ary inquiry which t ook place in 2010-11.
7 Whilst acknowledging t hat t he lower-t han-planned performance was due t o causes t hat were largely beyond t he reach of regional policy (such as t he poorer t han ant icipat ed t rends in t he global economy), t his debat e brought forward a number of well founded crit icisms t o t he nuova programmazione, including: t he fragment at ion of policy int o a myriad of proj ect s, which has been deemed det riment al t o t he achievement of t he necessary crit ical mass (especially in cert ain areas of expendit ure); t he excessive localism in t he policy choices made; t he ineffect ual cent ral level coordinat ion and guidance; t he excessive emphasis placed on spend and spending capacit y rat her t han on result s (not least due t o t he considerable use of so called ' coherent proj ect s' , which absorbed almost one t hird of t he t ot al spend); relat ed, an overall low qualit y of t he proj ect s implement ed; and, t he delays and difficult ies met wit h proj ect implement at ion, not least due t o t he preferent ial use of ' negot iat ed inst rument s' such as t he t errit orial pact s, programming cont ract s and int egrat ed t errit orial proj ect s (Padovani 2011; Servidio e Prezioso 2011; Cannari et al 2010a; CNEL 2010a; Rainoldi 2010 ).
However, not wit hst anding t hese weaknesses, what should be not ed first and foremost is t he fact t hat t he new st rat egic and operat ional approach pursued by t he nuova programmazione had already been de f act o dismissed, or at least debunked, before much of above analyt ical work. A cent ral argument of t his paper is t hat t his shift was due primarily t o polit ical rat her t han policy reasons, and that it had less to do with the lack of effect iveness of t he policy paradigm pursued unt il by t he nuova programmazione. The vicissit udes of t he 2007-13 Nat ional St rat egic Framework -a new st rat egic document int roduced by t he European regulat ory framework for 2007-13 -are part icularly illust rat ive of t his, in t hat t hey mark t he progressive realisat ion of a gradual shift , implicit and concealed at first , t hat became increasingly overt over t ime, which culminat ed in t he recent approval of t he ' Plan for t he Sout h' . European Policies Research Cent re St rat egically t his document placed it self in a line of cont inuit y wit h t he economic development paradigm pursued during t he previous period -as it ret ained t he endogenous, place-based, compet it iveness-orient ed approach 9 -but t ook t his furt her, int roducing a number of innovat ions, not ably:
The journey of the 2007-13 National Strategic Framework
• The affirmat ion of a new 'unitary regional policy' t hat would merge bot h st rands of regional policy -EU (funded by Europe' s cohesion policy) and domest ic (funded by t he FAS) -int o a single, 7-year st rat egic framework. This marked " a real discont inuit y wit h
t he past : f or t he f irst t ime since t he closure of t he special int ervent ion in t he Mezzogiorno and f rom t he birt h of t he ' ordinary' int ervent ion in t he depressed areas, one is able t o bring back t o logical coherence t he dif f erent t rickles of public int ervent ion in t he f ield of development policy, in a homogenous manner t hroughout t he nat ional t errit ory"
(CNEL 2010a, p. 47), t hus st rengt hening st rat egic planning as well as t ransparency and account abilit y.
• A restated territorial emphasis on the Mezzogiorno, int ended as t he aggregat e of t he eight Sout hern regions, not wit hst anding t he non-eligibilit y of almost half of t heseAbruzzo, Molise and Sardinia -t o t he so-called ' Convergence Obj ect ive' of cohesion policy (the former Obj ective 1). It should be borne in mind that whilst the NSF, in line wit h t he European regulat ions, covers t he ent ire count ry, it focuses especially on t he Mezzogiorno, where it concent rat es about t wo t hirds of resources. The focus on t he Mezzogiorno, rat her t han on t he Convergence regions only, marked an at t empt t o det ach It alian regional policy from t he rigid st rat egic and operat ional const raint s of t he European regulat ions and st rat egies, assert ing t he willingness t o implement a st rong development policy based on domest ic priorit ies and paramet ers. This goal was also support ed by t he financial commit ment t o reserve 85% of t he domest ic fund for regional development (FAS) t o t his area.
• A new performance reserve system for the Mezzogiorno regions, linked, coherent ly wit h t he development paradigm pursued, t o t he achievement s realised in four key essent ial public services in t he fields of educat ion, child and elderly care, urban wast e and wat er infrast ruct ure, so-called ' obiet t ivi di servizio' (Brezzi and Ut ili 2007).
• In addit ion, t his policy framework int ended t o build on t he implement at ion of import ant policy decisions t aken during t he earlier phase, most import ant ly t he commit ment , seen as inst rument al t o t he regional policy st rat egy pursued by t he NSF, t o ring-fence a quota of ordinary capital spending (i.e. broader public spending, not aimed at regional development ) for the Mezzogiorno. • From t he profile of t he governance, t he new st rat egy ant icipat ed a reinforced coordination role by the central Government -in a framework of furt her regionalisat ion of policy delivery (in line wit h t he Const it ut ional reform of Tit le V of t he Const it ut ion and wit h t he reform of t he syst em for t he elect ion of regional governors and execut ives) -t hrough t he mediat ion and support ing role of t he Depart ment for Development and Economic Cohesion. In t his new framework, cent ral administ rat ions were left wit h compet encies in nat ional st rat egic mat t ers (e.g., research, securit y, and educat ion), as well as t he t ask of coordinat ion, monit oring, and evaluat ion. Whilst t he regional level has […] t he knowledge t o select good proj ect s, t he cent ral level has t o guarant ee general qualit y st andards and consist ency wit h t he main general obj ect ives of t errit orial policy. This in t urn means t hat proj ect select ion is carried out at regional level while t he cent ral level is responsible of set t ing guidelines and general rules, regulat ing t he allocat ion of resources, pinpoint ing t he main t arget s, carrying on diagnost ic monit oring and providing t echnical assist ance (Brezzi and Ut ili 2007, p. 4 ).
All of t hese feat ures were subst ant ially weakened in t he few years t hat followed t he approval of t he NSF, in a number of ways.
1.
The unitary regional policy -The foundat ions of t he ' unit ary' regional policy were a j oint , mult i-annual financial plan for t he policy and t he implement at ion of a series of spending programmes -some cofinanced by European cohesion policy and some wit h only domest ic resources 11 -which t oget her would realise t he ambit ious goals out lined in t he NSF.
In t his framework, each regional aut horit y would not j ust devise and implement t he Operat ional Programmes cofunded by t he European St ruct ural Funds, 12 as had been t he case hit hert o, but also an operat ional programme out lining t he use t o be made over t he period of FAS resources (known as PAR -Piano At t uat ivo Regionale). These lat t er programmes would also fund t ypes of invest ment s not eligible under cohesion policy and t heir role was part icularly relevant for t he t hree Mezzogiorno regions not covered by t he Convergence st at us. These regions, in t urn, would also benefit from FAS-funded nat ional and int er-regional programmes -known Piani At t uat ivi Nazionali (PAN) 13 and Programmi At t uat ivi Int erregionali -operat ing in t he same policy areas for which, in t he five Convergence regions, t here are cohesion policy funded nat ional and int erregional operat ional programmes. 14 An overview of t his composit e programming framework is present ed in t he diagram below.
It was t hrough t his compound (and complex!) implement at ion and financial framework t hat t he goals of t he NSF and t he t arget s of t he performance reserve on essent ial services would be achieved. However, t he real basis for t his ambit ious framework -which required considerable planning and coordinat ion effort s bet ween and wit hin different levels of government -was of course t he fruit ion of t he planned resources: not such an obvious fact , given t he novelt y represent ed by t he t ying-up of domest ic resources for a seven-year t imescale (domest ic economic planning is art iculat ed on one and t hree year t imescales) and t he wider public finance sit uat ion, charact erised by a public debt amongst t he highest in t he developed world -119% of GDP in 2010 (Minist ero , and resources assigned t o coherent proj ect s but which had not been t he subj ect of legally binding commit ment s by t he same dat e). 17 These were: (i) a newly est ablished Social Fund for employment and t raining, t he resources of which were dest ined t o finance t he CIG and t raining; (ii) an Infrast ruct ure Fund for act ions aimed at boost ing nat ional infrast ruct ure net works (including IT and energy net works, t he implement at ion of safet y maint enance work in schools, environment al regenerat ion act ivit ies, prison building, museum and archaeological infrast ruct ure, t echnological innovat ion and st rat egic infrast ruct ures for mobilit y, such as railway invest ment s); (iii) a nat ion-wide St rat egic Fund locat ed wit hin t he Presidency of Minist ers t o support t he real economy, compet it iveness and development (also known as t he Presidency Fund), wit hout clear indicat ion of specific dest inat ions. These t hree funds operat e out side t he original st rat egy of t he NSF, but in principle maint ain t he commit ment of 85 percent earmarking also allowed regional aut horit ies t o use t he 2007-13 FAS resources t o part ially offset t heir Nat ional Healt h Service debt , an opport unit y t hat was seized by at least some amongst t he Mezzogiorno regions (e.g. Sicily), t hus undermining furt her t he st rat egy of t he Nat ional St rat egic Framework.
As a result of t he above cut s and redeployment s, t hree out of four nat ional FAS programmes foreseen by t he NSF were abolished (t hose for Educat ion, Research and Compet it iveness, and Net work and Mobilit y), whilst t he regional and int erregional programmes were maint ained but wit h financial cut s in t he region of 6-5 percent of t he originally planned resources. The removal of t hese resources and t he abolit ion of t he nat ional FAS Programmes will have a part icular impact on t he non-Convergence The government and t he Parliament , also t hrough an agreement Government -Regions … have considerably alt ered in t he past mont hs bot h t he framework of t he policy and t he overall availabilit y of resources. These modificat ions are j udged as not agreeable by t he 64% of t he int erviewed and agreeable only by 29%, whereas t he remaining 7% preferred not t o comment . This is t hus a rat her negat ive assessment : in part icular, almost t he t ot alit y of responses crit icises t he dest inat ion to other aims of part of the resources of t he nat ional quot a of t he Fund for Underut ilised areas, involved in cut s and redeployment s oft en of lit t le coherence wit h t he mission of t he Fund. Similarly, t he concent rat ion of resources in t he t hree cent ral funds is assessed negat ively …, bot h because t his engenders t he risk of a dest inat ion of t he resources not t o t he Mezzogiorno but generically t o ot her t errit ories (as it is not anymore possible t o guarant ee t he respect of t he 85-15 percent repart it ion) and because eliminat ing t he operat ional programmes t he degree of polit ical discret ion in t he use of resources increases, frust rat ing, in pract ice, t hat which t he part s t hemselves had assessed as t he main posit ive novelt y of t he new programming cycle, t hat is t he possibilit y t o j oint ly plan t he resources of t he St ruct ural Funds and of t he FAS" (CNEL 2010a, p.107, own t ranslat ion from It alian). 18 Given t hat t he Convergence regions and Basilicat a (t ransit ional support ) benefit from similar int ervent ions under t he Convergence NOPs. 19 The procedures for t he approval of t hese programmes involved t he appraisal and approval by t he nat ional coordinat ing administ rat ion for regional policy (t he Depart ment for Development and Economic Cohesion of t he Minist ry of Economic Development ) and subsequent confirmat ion by t he CIPE (t he Int er-Minist erial Commit t ee for Economic Programming), followed by adopt ion by t he Minist ry of t he act t hrough which t he St at e assumes t he obligat ion for t he annual quot as of FAS resources, as indicat ed in t he financial plans of t he Regional Implement at ion Programmes (PAR). t he Depart ment , in it s role of int erface on regional policy bet ween t he nat ional Government and t he regional aut horit ies, has had t o pay t he price of t he uncert aint ies and indet erminat eness t hat have charact erised t he policy in t he last few years (most not ably on t he availabilit y of FAS resources and t he new direct ion t hat regional policy would t ake under t he Berlusconi Government t hat came t o power aft er t he approval of t he NSF): t his undermined it s credibilit y in bringing forward a plan (t he NSF) whose fut ure was so evident ly uncert ain. The prot ract ed int ernal reorganisat ion process wit hin t he Minist ry and t he polit ical vicissit udes t hat led t o t he resignat ion of Minist er Scaj ola in May 2010, including t he five mont hs of st alemat e before t he appoint ment of a new Minist er, 23 cont ribut ed t o t he Depart ment ' s reduced incisiveness. Last ly, in June 2010, t he 2011-13 financial init iat ive reallocat ed 20 An issue recent ly addressed also by t he Governor of t he Bank of It aly, who has emphasised t hat " regional policies can int egrat e t he available resources, allowing an increased t errit orial concent rat ion, cont rast ing negat ive ext ernalit ies and st rengt hening t he posit ive ones. But t hey cannot subst it ut e t he good funct ioning of ordinary inst it ut ions.
never been achieved even prior t o t his act (Viest i 2009). This has result ed in t he
[…] It is necessary t o direct t he commit ment especially t owards t he general policies, which have obj ect ives referred t o t he whole Count ry, and concent rat e on t he environment al condit ions t hat render t heir applicat ion more difficult and less effect ive in some areas' , Draghi 2009, p. 6 (own t ranslat ion from It alian). 21 This report is submit t ed annually by t he Minist ry compet ent for regional development t o t he Parliament t o illust rat e t he t errit orial t rends in t he Mezzogiorno and Cent re-Nort h and t he implement at ion of regional policy. 22 The 2009 report was present ed on 15 July 2010, t he 2010 report is st ill pending. What is st ill surviving from t he original framework out lined by t he NSF are t he performance reserve syst em relat ed t o t he obiet t ivi di servizio (of c. €3 billion init ially, but cut by 20% wit h CIPE Deliberat ion of January 2011) and t he 85% ring-fencing of t he FAS fund (in programmat ic t erms at least -t he act ual compliance to this threshold would have to be verified). Bot h measures, however, have been undermined by t he recent changes discussed above: t he achievement of t he t arget s of t he performance reserve on essent ial services for t he 3 non-Convergence Mezzogiorno regions is called int o quest ion by t he unavailabilit y of FAS resources and by t he suppression of t he nat ional FAS programmes (e.g. in t he field of educat ion); whilst t he 85% earmarking, albeit rest at ed as a principle, has been weakened by it s reduced value in absolut e t erms, derived from t he reduct ion of t he t ot al volume of FAS allocat ions and by t he lack of cogent mechanisms t o ensure t he respect of t his norm (which in fact , as far as t he redeployment s above discussed are concerned has been quest ioned).
The approval of the Plan for the South
The last inst alment in t he reframing of regional policy which st art ed in 2008 has been t he recent approval of t he Plan for t he Sout h. Aft er repeat ed announcement s and post ponement s t he main lines of t he Plan were made public in November 2010. On 3 August 2011, t he CIPE approved t he allocat ion of a first t ranche of resources -circa £7.4 billiont o 134 proj ect s, bet ween maj or nat ional t ransport infrast ruct ures (rail and roads, six large proj ect s) and int erregional, regional and local infrast ruct ures (128 proj ect s, not j ust on rail and roads, but wat er management , broadband and indust rial infrast ruct ures).
The Plan, a slim document of 36 pages, consist s of t hree " st rat egic priorit ies for t he development of t he Sout h" -(i) infrast ruct ures, environment and public goods; (ii) compet ences and educat ion; and, (iii) innovat ion, research and compet it iveness -and five " st rat egic priorit ies for t he improvement of t he socio-economic environment and of t he condit ions in which cit izens and firms operat e" : (i) safet y and legalit y; (ii) cert aint y of t he st at e of law; (iii) a more efficient and t ransparent public administ rat ion; (iv) t he Mezzogiorno Bank; and, (v) t arget ed and fast support t o firms, employment and agricult ure.
Compared t o t he NSF, it includes t wo new priorit ies -on safet y and legalit y, and on t he cert aint y of t he st at e of law -and discards t he NSF' s priorit ies on energy and urban syst ems (except for t he part on urban t ransport s) (see Table 1 below). It t hus marks a depart ure from t he approach of t he NSF (and t hus of t he nuova programmazione). P4 -Social inclusion and services for t he qualit y of life and t errit orial at t ract iveness P4 -Safet y and legalit y P5 -Full exploit at ion of cult ural and nat ural resources for t errit orial at t ract iveness P5 -Cert aint y of t he st at e of law P6 -Net works and links for mobilit y P6 -A more efficient and t ransparent public administ rat ion P7 -Compet it iveness of product ive syst ems and employment P7 -The Mezzogiorno Bank P8 -Compet it iveness and at t ract iveness of cit ies and urban syst ems P8 -Target ed and fast support t o firms, employment and agricult ure P9 -Int ernat ional openness, and at t ract ion of invest ment s, consumpt ion and resources P10 -Governance, inst it ut ional capacit ies, and compet it ive and effect ive market s Sources: NSD 2007-13 and Plan for t he Sout h. According t o t he Government , t his change of direct ion was due t o a markedly different " socioeconomic cont ext compared t o t hat in which t he programming for t he funds for t he period 2007-13 had been const ruct ed. The change of st rat egic priorit ies t hat derives from t his is reflect ed for t he Sout h in t he Nat ional Plan for t he Sout h" .
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Alt hough t he Plan clearly aims t o address some of t he short comings of t he nuova programmazione, for inst ance by increasing concent rat ion and result s-orient at ion, a key crit ical element of t he Plan relat es t o t he fact t hat it does not ent ail t he allocat ion of new resources 25 (indeed, in January 2011, t he FAS resources planned in t he NSF were reduced furt her, wit h cut s reaching a cumulat ed level of -25%). 26 In ot her words, t he plan relies on 24 CIPE Deliberat ion of 11 January 2011, OJ no. 80 of 7 April 2011, point 7. t he " re-programming of t he funds for t he Sout h of nat ional and communit y source" (Minist ero per gli Affari Regionali, 2010, p. 35) . This is pot ent ially harmful because alt ering t he cont ent of t he programmes cofinanced by European cohesion policy requires t he renegot iat ion of t hese wit h t he European Commission which is t ime-consuming: a problem when It aly' s expendit ure rat e is already amongst t he lowest in Europe and t he programmes are already exposed t o t he risk of decommit ment (Trigilia 2011). 27 Moreover, whilst int roducing measures t o ensure financial rigour and speed-up expendit ure (t horough new t arget -orient ed ' inst it ut ional cont ract s' linked t o binding ' chronoprogrammes' ) 28 , t he Plan seems t o lack t he mult i-annual, longer-t erm st rat egic breat h t hat t he unit ary regional policy aimed t o achieve. The provision t hat it will be updat ed annually on t he basis of it s implement at ion progress, moreover, poses t he risk of exposing t he st rat egy in fut ure t o fluct uat ing polit ical preferences and suggest s t hat t he Plan' s implement at ion in fut ure years may become undermined by t he same economic condit ions t hat also det ermined t he cut s of FAS resources from t he current NSF. Despit e t he provision for ' concert at ion' wit h t he regional aut horit ies on t he int ervent ions implement ed, t he approach appears more cent ralist t han t he previous framework, which is at odd wit h t he supposed federalist move current ly pursued by t he Government (as also observed by t he Associat ion of It alian Municipalit ies, ANCI 2010). 27 According t o EPRC calculat ions based on Commission dat a at May 2010, It aly is t he t hird slowest spender, followed only by Bulgaria and Romania (Michie 2011, p. 3). Halfway t hrough t he programme period, t he level of expendit ure of It alian programmes is lower t han it was at t he same t ime during t he 2000-06 period. According t o lat est dat a by IGRUE (t he It alian Account ing Depart ment wit hin t he Minist ry of Economy and Finances), relat ing t o t he financial implement at ion at 31 August 2010 (dat a published in Oct ober 2010), t he Convergence programmes have a level of commit ment s and expendit ure of only 17.05% and 7.4%, a significant ly lower rat e compared t o t he same period in 2000-06 (Polverari and Vit ale 2010) . Commissioner Hahn, in t he above cit ed let t er, raised concerns t oo, highlight ing in part icular t he difficult ies faced by t he ERDF OPs of Campania, Sicily, Sardinia, Abruzzo, Lazio and Cult ural At t ract ors. It should be not ed t hat t he Government has t aken act ion t o speed up t he expendit ure of cofinanced programmes and t o avoid aut omat ic decommit ment s in t he framework of cohesion policy. First , a short t erm measure which was t aken t o accelerat e t he expendit ure in 2011 was t o re-programme t he regional OPs, so t hat t hey can fund invest ment s in t he fields of educat ion and R&I which have already been posit ively appraised under t he NOPs dedicat ed t o t hese t hemes, but not funded due t o lack of resources (t he ROPs also include t hese t wo priorit y t hemes). Second, wit h longer-t erm perspect ive, and also t o give a st rong signal about t he Government ' s commit ment t o ensure t hat resources are not lost t hrough decommit ment , t he Government has set up a st rict plan of commit ment and expendit ure t arget s for each co-funded OP, wit h verificat ions on 31 May 2011 and 31 December 2012 for t he levels of commit ment and on 31 Oct ober 2011 for t he levels of expendit ure. Those programmes which will not have achieved t heir commit ment and expendit ure t arget s will see t heir financial allocat ions reduced and reallocat ed t o ot her programmes (allocat ions 2013). This is a domest ic sanct ioning mechanism, t hat would precede (and, hopefully, prevent ) possible N+2 sanct ions. The first verificat ion was on 31 May and t he result s were not ified on 15 June. The measure was successful in det ermining a st rong accelerat ion of commit ment s, wit h only t wo programmes not achieving t arget s: t he Int erregional OP Cult ural At t ract ors and t he ROP Sardinia. The former will see it s resources cut and reallocat ed t o ot her programmes (c. €15 million, t hus a symbolic/ pedagogic sanct ion), t he second will carry out an internal reallocation (due to its Phasing In status and the fact that it is the only Phasing In programme in It aly, i.e. resources from t his programme could not be reallocat ed t o ot her programmes). 28 It is int erest ing here t o not e t he repechage of a t erm int roduced in t he very first years of t he nuova programmazione. See CIPE Deliberat ion of 11 January 2011, OJ no. 80 of 7 April 2011.
CONCLUSIONS
What st rikes from t he above review is t hat t he current Berlusconi-led Government marked a halt of t he regional policy effort t o develop t he Mezzogiorno. This sit s oddly wit h t he elect oral loyalt y manifest ed by t hese t errit ories t o t he Cent re-Right (six out of eight Mezzogiorno regions are current ly governed by Cent re-Right coalit ions: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia).
The current Government ' s init ial ambiguous, perhaps concealed behaviour wit h regard t o t he Nat ional St rat egic Framework 2007-13 (including t he virement of resources t owards ot her policy priorit ies) and t he subsequent ly more overt shift from it , embodied by t he Plan for t he Sout h, have caused a subst ant ial halt in regional policy for more t han half of t he current programming period. This will have harmful consequences for t he socio-economic development of t he region, but may also be det riment al t o t he fut ure availabilit y of already budget ed EU resources, placed at risk of decommit ment by t he low spending performance achieved t hus far (generat ing, prospect ively, an even higher impact on t he socio-economic condit ion of t he region). The abandonment of t he commit ment (never achieved) t o rebalance t he proport ion of capit al spending flowing t o t he t wo part s of t he Count ry also cont ribut es t o condemn t he Mezzogiorno t o it s lagging st at us compared t o t he rest of t he Count ry, as it undermines regional policy. The approval and launch of t he Plan of t he Sout h wit h no addit ional (in fact wit h reduced) resources, t hree years aft er t he Government t ook power in May 2008, cannot be viewed as a serious commit ment but rat her as a polit ical manoeuvre t o promot e t he image of a Government , and of some of it s members, t hat is sensit ive t o t he Mezzogiorno quest ion, whilst at t he same t ime redirect ing t he few available domest ic public resources t owards proj ect s close t o t he heart of t he Government (an import ant considerat ion at a t ime of st rong financial t ight ening).
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There is t oday abundant evidence on t he successes and failures of t he nuova programmazione. This evidence shows t hat -in addit ion t o t he concept ual and operat ional weaknesses not ed in sect ion 3 -t he failure of t he new regional policy was largely due t o t he lack of synergy and coherence wit h domest ic ordinary public spending and it s t errit orial dist ribut ion (Padovani 2001; Cannari et al 2010a; Barca 2010) . As observed by Cannari et al, " addit ional capit al expendit ure in t he Sout h is in t he region of 5 percent of t he t ot al public spend in the area. It is s elf-evident that what mat t ers is t he t ot al expendit ure and it s qualit y … it is difficult t o imagine t hat t he regional policies wit h 5 percent of t he expendit ure could significant ly affect t he development of t he lagging areas" (Cannari et al 2010a, p. 170) . It is legit imat e t o assume t hat , had t he present Government been serious about overcoming t he Sout hern quest ion it would have insist ed on t his lever, rat her t han t he reverse, t hat is reducing t he already planned resources for domest ic regional policy (t he 5 percent ).
But a similar lack of int erest by t he polit ical class t owards regional policy for t he Mezzogiorno can be t raced back t o t he mid 2000s (Barca 2006 (Barca , 2010 , as wit nessed for inst ance by t he ' st op-and-go' course of regional incent ive schemes (Barca 2006; Servidio and Prezioso 2011) and, since 2007, t heir virt ual abolit ion (Servidio and Prezioso 2011 The same evaluat ion report also not ed t hat , at t he regional and local levels, it was t he engagement of t he polit ical classes t hat made t he difference, observing t hat t he at t it ude of polit icians was t he fact or t hat explained t he maj orit y of t he differences in t he implement at ion performance of programmes, wit h t he result t hat " a st ronger, more cont inuous and more t ransparent involvement [of t he polit ical level] improves t he performance" (Vision & Value & The London School of Economics 2003, pp. 14-15).
So, already mid-way int o t he past programme period much of t he polit ical commit ment t owards regional policy and t he nuova programmazione had gone lost . This lack of int erest was however t empered, in it s effect s, by t he subst ant ial geographical coincidence of t he policy for t he Mezzogiorno wit h cohesion policy (wit h t he except ion of Abruzzo). This coincidence allowed a t eam of t echnocrat s, bot h at nat ional and at regional levels, t o at t empt t o cont inue -under t he ' prot ect ion' of t he rules of European cohesion policy -t he reform process init iat ed wit h t he " One hundred ideas" . In t he meanwhile, t his had st art ed t o bear fruit s, most not ably wit h regard t o t he improvement of public administ rat ion capacit ies in t he Sout hern regions, where even a spillover effect on t he wider public administ rat ion could be det ect ed (Vision & Value and The London School of Economics 2003). Wit hout cont inued support from t he polit ical élit es, however, t his act iont ransformed int o a t echnocrat ic and ' self-referent ial' exercise -could not be sust ained and even t he formidable result s achieved wit h regard t o t he administ rat ion of t he policy, in t erms of planning, monit oring and evaluat ion, could not always be cont inued, as wit nessed by t he recent ret renchment s report ed in some regions: t he simple fact t hat it has been necessary t o reint roduce ' chrono-programmes' and financial t arget s for t he cofinanced programmes is a pat ent sign of t his regression.
On t he whole, t hus, one can share t he assessment made by Carabba t hat t he " lack of int erest t owards t he Sout h is cont rast ed, wit h some result , only by t he cycle of negot iat ed programming opened by Ciampi Minist er of Treasury in 1996 (wit h t he t echnical guidance of Fabrizio Barca" (2011, p. 12 
, own t ranslat ion).
But what have been t he reasons for t his supposed lack of polit ical commit ment t owards t he development of t he Sout h? According t o Fabrizio Barca, t he policy launched in 1998 … t riggers in t he Mezzogiorno a violent opposit ion: resist ance, at t acks of any sort . St rong int erest s are at play and many local ruling classes grown on rent posit ions and on bad administ rat ion risk t o lose t heir privileges. In t his sit uat ion, apart t han in t he first year of t he st rat egy, in Rome nat ional polit ics pret ends not t o hear, or worse (Barca 2010, p. 176 , own t ranslat ion from It alian).
Looking at t he most recent period, t hat from 2008 t o dat e, it would seem t hat t he NSF ' went t oo far' . It s allocat ion of copious amount s of domest ic resources t o t he development of t he Mezzogiorno proved not palat able t o nat ional polit icians preoccupied wit h running nat ional economic policy in a cont ext of increased fiscal aust erit y and wit h maint aining consensus among t he elect orat e in t he Nort h, t radit ionally more engaged in polit ics and more ' demanding' vis-à-vis t he public act or.
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As not ed, unt il 2000-06 regional policy for t he Mezzogiorno had largely coincided wit h European cohesion policy. Maximising cohesion policy receipt s, including by ensuring t he availabilit y of t he necessary domest ic cofinancing and a sat isfact ory financial implement at ion (so as t o t o avoid decommit t ment s) was an obvious goal, given It aly' s net payer st at us in t he European budget (and t he fact t hat cohesion policy is t he budget heading t hat moderat es t his net payer posit ion). The fact t hat virt ually all Mezzogiorno regions unt il t he end of 2006 were eligible t o t he most int ense form of support under cohesion policy -t he Obj ect ive 1 -accomplished a double achievement : on t he one hand, it maint ained int o exist ence a financially consist ent policy package for t his region (comparable t o t hat which had been in place under t he Special Int ervent ion); on t he ot her, it ensured t he cert aint y of domest ic confinancing allocat ions: having been included in binding programmes, approved by Bruxelles, such commit ment s had t o be maint ained. It could not affect t he domest ic side of regional policy, of course, but t his was rat her marginal.
This sit uat ion changed considerably in 2007, when t hree regions exit ed t he Obj ect ive 1 (now renamed Convergence Obj ect ive). The at t empt made t o compensat e t his wit h a much st rengt hened domest ic side of t he policy failed part ly exact ly because, for t his area of spend, t he ext ernal const raint represent ed by Brussels was not t here. Furt her fact ors were t he effect s of t he recession and t he poor spending performance by t he FAS fund in 2000-06.
The st agnat ion t hat t he count ry experiment ed in t he past decade, aggravat ed by t he recent recession, led t o t he emergence of a ' nort hern quest ion' (González 2011), according t o which t he Cent re-Nort h t oo needs t o be support ed t o regain compet it iveness (besides, it is argued, if t he count ry' s wealt hier vanguards are st ruggling, how can t he backward Mezzogiorno be expect ed t o do well?). Whilst t he delays in t he use of FAS allocat ion in t he 30 In t his regard, it is int erest ing t o quot e a st udy by Giordano et al (2009) which examined t he levels of efficiency for four essent ial services (educat ion, healt hcare, j ust ice and nurseries) in all It alian regions and relat ed t hese t o cit izens' engagement in public life and t heir more or less act ive monit oring of t he act ivit y of policy-makers. They found t hat t he efficiency was higher where t he part icipat ion in polit ical life was also higher and concluded t hat " at whichever level of government , a well funct ioning administ rat ion requires an act ive part icipat ion by t he cit izens, t heir willingness t o invest t ime and resources t o cont rol and, if necessary, punish inefficient polit icians at t he t ime of elect ions" , p. 275.
Mezzogiorno prompt ed t he Government t o call int o quest ion t he absorpt ion capacit y of t he Sout hern regions, providing a j ust ificat ion for t he cut s t o t he FAS allocat ions for 2007-13.
In sum, even t hough t here have been a number of short coming in t he nuova programmazione, what has failed rat her t han t he policy seems t o have been t he commit ment of t he polit ical class t o really ' invest ' in it , also by redressing t he balance of capit al expendit ure flowing t o t he t wo macro-aggregat es and by achieving a more effect ive synergy bet ween regional policy and t he sect oral policies and broader public spending. It would t hus appear t hat if aft er 150 years from it s unificat ion and 20 years from t he end of t he Special Int ervent ion It aly remains a divided Count ry, t his has not j ust been due t o t he pursuit of a ' wrong' policy response, but also t o t he lack of genuine polit ical commit ment . Polit ical engagement has failed at t he nat ional level -as t he event s above discussed have shown -but also, as demonst rat ed by t he ext remely poor spending performance of cofinanced programmes, at regional level (inexplicably given t he current financial climat e).
But how can t his be explained? In 1911, 50 years aft er unificat ion, Leopoldo Franchet t i, a well-known polit ician and meridionalist of t he t ime, wrot e:
The fact is t hat , from 1861 onwards, all government s of whichever part y have seen in t he Mezzogiorno of It aly not a Count ry t o govern, but a group of deput ies t o reconcile […] t he It alian St at e has believed, erroneously, that it was necessary to renounce to it s high office t o obt ain vot es in Parliament […],unt il t he past decade it has renounced t o undert ake t he part t hat it should play in t he solut ion of t he fundament al problem for t he redempt ion of t he Mezzogiorno: t he problem of it s economic regenerat ion (Franchet t i 1911, p. 23 , own t ranslat ion from It alian).
Reading t his st at ement wit h t he above by Fabrizio Barca leads us t o quest ion how much has changed in over 100 years in t he social fabric of t his region and of It aly as a whole. Perhaps j ust like 100 years ago t he goal of t he development of t he Mezzogiorno is secondary t o t he maint enance of t he polit ical st at us quo, bot h nat ionally and in t he regions, which cit izens in t he Sout h have so far been not int erest ed or capable of challenging.
A final quest ion has t o be raised on t he fut ure inst it ut ional set -up of t he count ry and of t he Sout hern quest ion in t he new federalist organisat ion of t he St at e t hat is now t aking shape. Whereas t he current Government has been t epid t owards t o t he regional policy cause, it has been act ive -under t he const ant menace of t he Nort hern League -in pursuing t he complet ion of t he federalist framework ant icipat ed by t he const it ut ional reforms of 2001. Aft er approving law no. 42/ 2009 on fiscal federalism 31 , t he Government issued a number of implement at ion decrees, including a recent one on art . 16 of t he law, on t he " addit ional resources and special int ervent ions for t he removal of economic and social disequilibria" (in compliance wit h art . 119 of t he Const it ut ion).
32 It would be premature to attempt to make an assessment of t he impact of t hese reforms on t he Sout hern regions' socio-economic condit ion, and it would cert ainly require an in dept h empirical considerat ion t hat is well beyond t he ambit ion of t his cont ribut ion. However, what can be not ed is t hat alt hough t he revised Const it ut ion ent rust s t he prot ect ion of cit izenship right s t o t he exclusive compet ence of t he St at e (art . 117), t he effect ive realisat ion of t his provision will have t o rely on t he realisat ion of an effect ive vert ical and horizont al solidarit y (Carabba 2011) , which in t urn would require t he emergence of a nat ional consensus on t his idea. In t he light of t he above discussed development s, at present t his appears unlikely.
